the Russian Armies in 1915, and *the overthrow of Serbia* in the same year, provide illustrations of *offensive surprises* due to the refusal of Generals to take heed of *Russians* intelligence inconsistent with their cherished plans. The Russians had information which ought to have warned them that there was a formidable offensive contemplated by the Germans in the direction of Gorlice. But the Russian High Command had other ideas and other plans, and the information which came to them as to the probable Mackensen offensive was therefore disregarded. Hence although forewarned, the attack had the effect of surprise. The same observation applies to the attack on Serbia.

(f) The combined Austro-German-Bulgarian invasion of Serbia in October, 1915, was a strategical surprise in a sense at least that the Allies allowed *Serbia not* themselves to be taken unawares and *prepared* unprepared. It ought to have been fore- against. Ample warning had been given of the Austro-German plans and of the fact that Bulgaria meant to throw in her lot with them. But the attention of the Western Generals was so focussed on their own great blow in France that they turned their faces away from that impending danger in the East. When it came it had therefore to them all the effect of a surprise.

(g) To a certain extent the

Battle of Verdun presents another example of this type of surprise. The initial stage of the attack on the Verdun forts was not expected by the French Headquarters, not because they had not been forewarned of German preparations but because it did not suit their plans to believe them. The attack was therefore a great success. When it